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Abstract 
This research revisits the effects of a country’s institutional framework on individual 
firms’ behavior, in particular focusing on their propensity to comply with legal rules in 
transition economies. The authors purport to explain the variation in compliance with 
legal rules and employ a rich data set on thousands of firms from dozens of transition 
countries to this end. They find that most of the variation emanates from country-wide 
differences in institutional quality, although some firm characteristics play a role as well. 
They also find indications that differences across countries are smoothed with income.  
1. Introduction 
As forcefully emphasized in recent research, differences across countries in 
the rule of law and legal enforcement are important for economic performance. Re-
cent research efforts have documented this statistically. Thus, the work on legal ori-
gins (see, for example, Djankov et al., 2003; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; La Porta et 
al., 2008) shows that differences in legal rules across countries matter for investor 
protection, financial development, and more generally, efficient resource allocation. 
Acemoglu et al. (2005) find that legal enforcement of contracts trumps the effect of 
political institutions on financial development, investment and growth. Yet, the par-
able of the flat world used by Thomas Friedman in his bestseller (2006) suggests that 
globalization has erased differences across countries, making them similar econom-
ically and culturally (see Leamer, 2007, for pointed criticism and further literature 
references). This paper purports, therefore, to empirically tackle the significance of 
cross country differences, specifically focusing on how the rule of law is actually 
translated to legal compliance by business firms with emphasis on transition econo-
mies. 
Our data, further detailed below, seem to be especially well suited to deal with 
this objective. In particular, they contain proxies for law compliance by thousands of 
business firms from a wide range of transition economies that display large institu-
tional variation. While survey based, these data are invaluable, as internationally 
comparable measures of compliance are hard to come by. The data have information 
on several aspects of law compliance, such as the scope of corruption, bribery, and 
the extent of informality – by which is meant the propensity of firms to hide output.  
The null hypothesis – consistent with the “flat world” paradigm – is that most 
of the variation in informality is driven by firm-level characteristics, whereas the sig-
nificance of country-level characteristics, in particular a country’s institutional quali-
* The authors would like to thank Alberto Chong and Virgilio Galdo for comments and suggestions.
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Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 2                                              139 
ty, should be marginal. The analysis reveals that many of the available firm-level 
characteristics are indeed relevant to explain the variation in informality. For exam-
ple, firm size matters, and smaller firms appear to be hiding a larger share of output; 
in contrast, exporting firms and those with foreign ownership appear to hide less than 
otherwise. Yet, we find strong evidence that most of the variation is driven by differ-
ences across countries in their respective levels of institutional quality, thus rejecting 
the null hypothesis in favor of what is implied by our theoretical model. In particular, 
commonly used measures of institutional strength emerge as the most statistically 
significant variable in explaining informality and corruption behavior of the firms. 
Yet, we also find evidence of a convergence club, whereby differences in legal com-
pliance become smaller with a country’s income.  
This paper is related to recent work that examines the effects of countries’ 
legal institutions on various outcomes – see the review in La Porta et al. (2008) – 
and, more generally, to work that emphasizes the  role of institutional quality in 
development – see Acemoglu et al. (2005) for a review. Additional important recent 
efforts in this regard have been directed toward international trade. Thus, Berkowitz 
et al. (2006) and Rodrik et al. (2004) show that the quality of institutions is an im-
portant determinant of trade flows, and the latter paper also draws growth implica-
tions from this inference. Examining yet another aspect, Doidge et al. (2007) argue 
that country-wide variation in institutional quality is responsible for the bulk of varia-
tion in corporate governance across business firms. The data they use cover mostly 
developed economies, and the extent of countries covered is much smaller than here. 
While the focus in Doidge et al. (2007) is clearly very different from the one exam-
ined here, our results are complementary to theirs. The richness of our data, which 
include a  variety of countries, ensures that the  results have wide applicability. In 
work that is more specifically related to the current endeavor, Dabla-Norris et al. 
(2008) and Friedman et al. (2000) find that institutional quality is an important de-
terminant of informality; this work does not, however, distinguish between firm-level 
and country-level characteristics, and it ignores other aspects of illegality such as cor-
ruption that are studied here. Finally, Fisman and Miguel (2006), examining an as-
pect of illegal behavior of international diplomats stationed in New York City 
(violations of car parking regulations), find that it is correlated with their respective 
countries’ corruption indicators. While the authors do not distinguish between indi-
vidual and country-level characteristics, and their sample can hardly be considered as 
representative, the flavor of their results is consistent with ours. This is especially 
gratifying as their evidence, being based on objective data, should be viewed as com-
plementary to this paper’s findings. 
The remainder of the presentation is organized as follows. The next section 
describes the data and the empirical approach, followed by the actual empirical anal-
ysis in section 3. Section 4 then concludes with brief remarks. 
2. Data and Methodology 
We use the  World Business Environment Survey (World Bank, 2000) and 
include data for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Moldova, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. In total, there  
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Table 1  Variables Definition 
Variable Description 
Percentage of sales  
off the books  
Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully complying  
with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you 
estimate the typical firm in your area of activity keeps “off the books”:  
(0) Up to 30%, (1) more than 30%. Source: WBES (2000). 
Company is owned  
by a foreign investor 
Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the company is owned by 
a foreign investor, zero otherwise. Source: WBES (2000). 
Government owns  
the company 
Dummy variable that takes on the value one if any government agency 
or state body has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm, zero 
otherwise. Source: WBES. 
Exporter  If the firm exports. The variable takes the values: (1) Yes and (0) No. 
Source: WBES (2000). 
Number of competitors  Answer to the question: How many competitors do you face in your 
markets? Source: WBES (2000). 
Sector: Manufacturing, 
Services, Agriculture,  
and Construction 
5 dummies: (1) Manufacturing, (2) Services, (3) Agriculture, 
(4) Construction, and (5) Other (commerce; mining and quarrying; and 
electricity, gas and water). In all the regressions (5) is the omitted 
dummy. Source: WBES (2000). 
Size: Medium and Large 
3 dummies: (1) Small: 50-fewer employees, (2) Medium: 51 to 500 em-
ployees, and (3) Large: 501 to more employees. In all the regressions  
(1) is the omitted dummy. Source: WBES (2000). 
Years since the company 
was established 
Difference between the year in which the interview was taken and  
the year in which the firm was established. Source: WBES (2000). 
Log(GDP)  Logarithm of the average GDP for the period 1995–1999. Expressed  
in Constant 2000 US dollars. Source: WDI (2007). 
GDP growth (%)  Average rate of GDP growth (%) for the period 1995–1999.  
Source: WDI (2007). 
Labor regulations  
obstacle 
Country-level average of the answers to the question: Judge on a four 
point scale how problematic is labor regulation for the operation and 
growth of your business? 1 = No obstacle; 2 = Minor obstacle; 
3 = Moderate Obstacle; 4 = Major obstacle. Source: WBES (2000). 
Inflation rate  Average rate of inflation of the consumers’ price index for the period 
1995–1999. Source: WDI (2007). 
Effectiveness  
of the legislative  
Index of the effectiveness of the legislature. Ascending scale from 1 to 4 
(1 = no legislature; 2 = largely ineffective; 3 = partly effective; 4 = effective). 
Average of the years 1945 through 1998. Source: Botero et al. (2004). 
 
are about 2000 firms in our sample. The data cover enterprises’ responses to ques-
tions on the business environment as shaped by domestic economic policy, govern-
ance, and regulation, as well as assessments of public service quality, firm size, and 
growth. Our dependent variable defines informality as a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if the response to the question: “Recognizing the difficulties many enter-
prises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of to- 
tal sales would you estimate the typical firm in your area of activity keeps ‘off 
the books’?” includes values over 30%, and zero otherwise. We consider both firm- 
-level and country-level controls. Related to the former, we consider type of share 
ownership, exporting firms, competition, sectors, and firm size. In particular, foreign 
investors may respect domestic legislation more as they tend to be under more 
scrutiny. The same goes for firms that share ownership with the government. The ex-
pected sign of exporting firms is less obvious. On the one hand, their dealing in the in-  
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Table 2  Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Percentage of sales off the books  1854  0.44  0.47  0  1 
State  shares  ownership  1854 0.19 0.29 0  1 
Foreign  shares  ownership  1854 0.18 0.40 0  1 
Sector:  Manufacturing  1854 0.39 0.49 0  1 
Sector:  Service  1854 0.47 0.50 0  1 
Sector:  Agriculture  1854 0.06 0.23 0  1 
Sector:  Construction  1854 0.08 0.28 0  1 
If the firm exports  1854  0.49  0.48  0  1 
Number of competitors  1854  2.82  0.72  0  9 
Firm size: medium  1854  0.44  0.50  0  1 
Firm size: large  1854  0.18  0.39  0  1 
Log(GDP)  1854 25.75  1.62 22.77 29.79 
GDP  growth  1854 2.96 2.05  -1.20 8.76 
Inflation rate  1854  23.21  45.84  0.76  252.66 
Effectiveness of the legislative   1834  1.75  0.74  0.91  3.00 
Labor  regulations  obstacle  1834 2.45 0.43 1.68 3.46 
ICRG  institutional  index  1854 6.54 1.93 3.33  10.00 
ternational marketplace may force them to be more transparent, but the fact that they 
are more open gives them more opportunity to misbehave (Chong and Gradstein, 
2006). Related to the number of competitors, we may expect that firms with a higher 
number of competitors will tend to be attracted by informal transactions. We also 
include sector dummies for the five industries available in the survey, namely, serv-
ices, agriculture, manufacturing, and construction. Size dummies are also included. 
We expect smaller firms, having a  higher chance to be outside the  institutional 
system, to be more inclined to informality.  
Among the country-level control variables, of primary interest is the ICRG 
index, which captures the country’s institutional quality, and we expect a negative as-
sociation between institutional quality and the level of informality. Among country- 
-level controls we include gross domestic product, which we expect to yield a negative 
sign (Chong and Gradstein, 2006). Other controls are the rate of growth of the econo-
my, the rate of inflation, a labor regulation variable, and an institutional monitoring 
variable. Table 1 describes all our variables and Table 2 provides corresponding sum-
mary statistics. While we include several country-level variables, there may be some 
country-specific unobserved factors; the inclusion of a country-specific error term in 
the random effects model helps avoid this problem. As this methodology assumes 
that there is an identifier for each cluster of countries, it gives a robust inference, so 
the regressions presented all have robust standard errors, clustered by country.  
3. Results 
Table 3 shows the results. There are five specifications denoted in Table 3. 
The first one presents results using firm-specific variables only, where the percentage 
of sales to the state sector, foreign ownership, and whether the firm operates in other 
countries have the expected signs and are significant at conventional levels. In this 
specification, when a firm operates in the manufacturing sector it tends to be more  
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Table 3  Country and Firm Determinants of Informality 
Probit Regressions with Random Effects 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; (*) significant at 10 percent; (**) significant at 5 percent; (***) significant 
at 1 percent. Chi2-test of joint significance and its corresponding p-values are reported for each group 
of variables. Results shown correspond to marginal coefficients of random effects probit regressions. 
 
informal. This result is persistent across specifications that include firm character-
istics. Column 2 controls for country-level variables only. We find that institutions 
are associated with the expected negative sign, significant at the 1 percent level. Col-
Dependent variable: Percentage of sales off the books 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
-0.283**   -0.293**   -0.291** 
Foreign shares ownership 
(0.126)   (0.126)   (0.126) 
-0.241**   -0.220*   -0.232* 
Operate in other Countries 
(0.121)   (0.121)   (0.121) 
0.214*   0.222**   0.201* 
Sector: Manufacturing 
(0.112)   (0.110)   (0.110) 
0.101   0.086   0.071 
Sector: Service 
(0.136)   (0.135)   (0.135) 
-0.061   -0.046   -0.051 
If the firm exports 
(0.106)   (0.106)   (0.106) 
0.081   0.058   0.067 
Number of competitors 
(0.094)   (0.094)   (0.094) 
0.055   0.013   0.026 
Size: Medium 
(0.126)   (0.126)   (0.124) 
-0.145   -0.152   -0.149 
Size: Large 
(0.145)   (0.145)   (0.145) 
0.293***   0.266***   0.273*** 
% of sales to the State Sector 
(0.097)   (0.097)   (0.097) 
0.000   -0.000   0.001  Years since the firm  
was established  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
 0.120*  0.100  -0.880**  -0.938** 
Log(GDP)
  (0.068) (0.074) (0.410) (0.431) 
  1.399*** 1.195**  1.426*** 1.233*** 
External Debt (% GDP) 
  (0.442) (0.487) (0.430) (0.447) 
 -0.501***  -0.511***  -0.298*  -0.305* 
Effectiveness of the legislative 
  (0.149) (0.167) (0.165) (0.173) 
  0.077 0.103 0.349 0.360 
Labor regulations obstacle 
  (0.192) (0.219) (0.214) (0.223) 
 -0.213***  -0.227***  -5.029**  -5.230** 
ICRG institutional index 
  (0.056) (0.063) (1.954) (2.065) 
-0.942*** -2.425  -2.234  21.796** 22.935** 
Constant
(0.305) (1.609) (1.789) (9.928)  (10.438) 
Observations  1815 1823 1815 1823 1815 
Chi2 – firm variables  37.99   34.53   35.60 
Chi2 – country variables    47.41 37.93 53.25 47.59 
Chi2 – all variables  37.99 47.41 72.50 53.25 83.52 
Between countries fit  0.0789  0.241 0.237 0.250 0.246 
Within countries fit  0.208   0.215   0.214 
Overall fit  0.220 0.241 0.319 0.250 0.326 
Rho (portion of variance due to ui) 0.135 0.00136  0.00532  5.70e-07 4.46e-07 
Log likelihood  -491.0 -506.5 -482.1 -503.5 -479.2  
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umn 3 combines firm and country variables. They show that countries’ institutions 
matter more for firms’ behavior towards informality than firm-level variables. Chi- 
-squared tests of joint significance are included in each of the five specifications, 
which allows us to reject the null hypothesis that all firm-level variables, country- 
-level variables, and both together (firm and country level) are jointly equal to zero. 
Overall, the results presented in this section show that even when some firm-level 
characteristics are relevant in explaining informality, what really seems to matter is 
the differences across country-level variables such as the level of external debt, the ef-
fectiveness of the legislation and the ICRG institutional index, and more important is 
the fact that the results do not change much across specifications. Finally, columns 4 
and 5 repeat the same exercise under the presumption that endogeneity might be a prob-
lem. Two variables were instrumented in these regressions: the labor regulations ob-
stacle and the ICRG institutional index. For both of them, we used as instruments: 
democratic accountability, internal conflict, regional dummies, and the year of intro-
duction of current electoral rule. 
In order to test our results using random effects probit, we run the same spec-
ifications from Table 3 with other cut-off points, and we obtain similar results.Also 
as a robustness check, in Table 4 we employ alternative measures of institutional 
quality with sub-components of the ICRG index, and other governance indicators 
recently compiled by the World Bank (see Kaufmann et al., 2005). 
The results clearly indicate that country-wide differences in institutional qual-
ity matter a good deal for individual firms’ degree of informality, more so than firm- 
-specific characteristics, as is reflected by the differences in the between-countries fit 
and the within-countries fit.
1 Overall, we obtain very similar findings as before. Further-
more, the results suggest that there may exist a “convergence club” of richer coun-
tries across which firms’ behavior is alike, which is consistent with the influential 
thesis on income convergence across rich countries – see, for example, Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1995.
2  
The sampling methodology of the WBES does not take into account the eco-
nomic size of each country, which may obviously bias our findings. To correct for 
this, we use a randomized sample of the full number of firms in the survey, around 
ten thousand, and draw a random sample according to the gross domestic product of 
each country at the time of the survey. Based on the country with the highest GDP 
value, namely, the United States, we assign a corresponding number of observations 
for the rest of the countries available. With this random sample, we replicate our 
empirical specifications and the results obtained are reported in Table 5. The findings 
using a randomized sample indicate that the institutional quality of the country has 
a negative and statistically significant effect – at conventional levels – over infor-
mality. Similar to our previous findings, we find that when an interaction term be- 
1 For the sake of economy we only present the coefficients of our variables of interest as well as the R-
-squared and chi-statistic values of the joint significance tests. Full results are available upon request. 
2 We also check the robustness of our results by changing the proxy variable of informality to one more re-
lated to illegality and corruption. Specifically, the WBES contains information on the frequency of bribery 
payments made to various government agencies, such as the licensing authority, telephone companies, and 
tax authorities. Using the corresponding variables as dependent variables, we re-run specifications obtain-
ing similar results as when using the percentage of sales off the book. The reported results include the co-
efficients of the ICRG variables, the R-squared and the joint significance test chi-values.  
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Table 4  Informality, Institutions and GDP – Robustness to Institutional Measures
Dependent variable: Percentage of sales off the books 


















ICRG sub indices 
Corruption                    
(1) -0.179***   
 (0.051)   
87.31 35.22  153.8  0.275  0.143  0.386 
(2) -2.840**  0.142** 
 (1.286)  (0.056) 
88.38 11.78  138.9  0.235  0.142  0.321 
Rule of Law (0–6)             
(3) -0.117   
 (0.081)   
89.37 22.29  128.1  0.242  0.160  0.221 
(4) -2.966***  0.142*** 
 (0.896)  (0.038) 
89.22 26.19  142.2  0.277  0.166  0.274 
Governance 
Control of Corruption                   
(5) -0.311***   
 (0.090)   
96.53 28.93  143.5  0.234  0.161  0.292 
(6) -3.117***  0.124** 
 (1.154)  (0.040) 
94.12 9.88  144.6  0.192  0.158 0.298 
Rule of Law             
(7) -0.301***   
 (0.092)   
89.16 29.45  115.7  0.287  0.162  0.254 
(8) -3.111**  0.132** 
 (1.236)  (0.041) 
88.94 12.26  121.7  0.260  0.165  0.254 
Notes: Clustered by country, indeed robust, standard errors in parentheses; (*) significant at 10 percent;   
(**) significant at 5 percent; (***) significant at 1 percent. Chi2-test of joint significance is reported for 
each group of variables. The corresponding p-value for each group of variables is 0.00. Results shown 
correspond to marginal coefficients of random effects probit regressions. In all regressions, the number 
of countries is 34, and the number of observations is 3522. Except for the ICRG institutional index, 
specifications used for each pair of regressions are the same used in regressions (3) and (5) of Ta- 
ble 4, respectively. 
 
tween the ICRG institutional index and GDP is added, it becomes positive and statis-
tically significant. 
Institutional quality may be endogenous to informality. Furthermore, one could 
argue that there may also be causality from informal transactions made by firms to 
the institutional quality of the country. Also, the country-level average perception of 
firms about labor regulations may also show reverse causality with respect to infor-
mality. In order to deal with these potential problems we employ an instrumental 
variables approach for both variables. The instruments used are country-level vari-
ables as the ones that are instrumented, and they are the democratic accountability 
and internal conflict indices from ICRG, regional dummies, and the year of intro-
duction of the current electoral rule. 
The democratic accountability index is related to institutional quality, and 
the labor regulations, because democratic countries tend to be more stable and are 
more receptive to the claims and opinions of different social groups, so they tend to 
have strong institutions, and this also changes the  perception of labor regulation. 
The same goes for internal conflict. If a country has an armed opposition to the gov-
ernment and if the government indulges in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect,  
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Table 5  Informality, Institutions and GDP – Randomized Sample 
Dependent variable: 
Percentage of sales off the books 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Foreign shares ownership     -0.447***       -0.457***       -0.454*** 
  (0.094)  (0.094)  (0.054) 
State  shares  ownership  0.033  0.033  0.027 
 (0.123)      (0.122)    (0.177) 
Sector:  Manufacturing  -0.666  -0.614  -0.562 
   (0.643)     (0.643)     (0.773) 
Sector:  Service  -0.744  -0.746  -0.708 
   (0.621)     (0.631)     (0.742) 
Sector:  Agriculture  -0.725  -0.745  -0.679 
   (0.857)     (0.858)     (0.679) 
Sector:  Construction  -0.645  -0.634  -0.749 
   (0.637)     (0.642)    (0.640) 
If  the  firm  exports    -0.142*   -0.130  -0.418 
   (0.072)     (0.073)     (0.473) 
Number of competitors   0.035    0.035    0.039 
    (0.089)  (0.099)  (0.043) 
Size:  Medium  -0.184  -0.129*  -0.176* 
    (0.075)  (0.055)  (0.054) 
Size:  Large  -0.188  -0.193*  -0.186* 
   (0.464)    (0.100)    (0.61)
Years since the firm was 
established    -0.005**     -0.004**    -0.03** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Log(GDP)   0.087  0.085  -0.090  -0.313* 
    (0.062) (0.062)   (0.145) (0.187) 
GDP  growth    0.031 0.029 0.032 0.045 
    (0.048) (0.048)   (0.049) (0.034) 
Inflation  rate    0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
    (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002) 
Effectiveness of the legislative       -0.445***     -0.443***      -0.451***     -0.446*** 
    (0.122) (0.122)   (0.102) (0.131) 
Labor regulations obstacle    0.174  0.185   0.298   0.324* 
    (0.198) (0.188)   (0.194) (0.177) 
ICRG institutional index      -0.087**    -0.097**    -1.734**    -1.745** 
     (0.042)   (0.043)   (0.618)   (0.409) 
ICRG institutional index * GDP            0.056**     0.053** 
          (0.028)  (0.033) 
Constant  0.464  -2.364  -1.834    7.481   5.067* 
(0.465)   (1.457)  (1.671)    (4.275)  (2.809) 
Observations  1815 1815 1815 1815 1815 
Chi2  –  firm  variables  49.27 - 45.55 - 42.13 
    0.00      0.00      0.00 
Chi2  –  country  variables  -  36.04 32.84 32.43 33.97 
      0.00    0.00   0.00    0.00 
Chi2 – all variables  49.67  36.05  69.88  32.43  88.28 
  0.00   0.00    0.00   0.00    0.00 
Between countries fit  0.109 0.274 0.267 0.286 0.247 
Within  countries  fit  0.129 - 0.148 - 0.144 
Overall fit  0.175 0.274 0.305 0.286 0.413 
Rho (portion of variance  
due to ui) 0.193  0.093  0.0890 0.0840 0.0632 
Log  likelihood  -1392 -1278 -1184 -1355 -1379 
Notes: Clustered by country, indeed robust, standard errors in parentheses; (*) significant at 10 percent; (**) sig-
nificant at 5 percent; (***) significant at 1 percent. Chi2-test of joint significance and its corresponding  
p-values are reported for each group of variables. Results shown correspond to marginal coefficients of 
random effects probit regressions.  
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Table 6  Informality, Institutions and GDP – Instrumental Variables 
Dependent variable: 
Percentage of sales off the books 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Foreign shares ownership    -0.344***    -0.382*** 
   (0.052)    (0.072) 
State  shares  ownership   -0.284***   -0.280*** 
   (0.068)    (0.098) 
Sector: Manufacturing    -0.126    -0.308 
   (0.563)    (0.548) 
Sector: Service    -0.278    -0.438 
   (0.511)    (0.546) 
Sector: Agriculture    -0.211    -0.458 
   (0.551)    (0.554) 
Sector: Construction    -0.133    -0.278 
   (0.546)    (0.550) 
If the firm exports    -0.068    -0.098 
   (0.071)    (0.061) 
Number  of  competitors   0.074**   0.097** 
   (0.035)    (0.045) 
Size: Medium    -0.075    -0.096 
   (0.099)    (0.059) 
Size: Large    -0.274***    -0.277*** 
   (0.047)    (0.087) 
Years since the firm was established    -0.008    -0.002 
   (0.008)    (0.002) 
Log(GDP) 0.044  0.055  -0.321*  -0.378** 
  (0.053) (0.060) (0.192) (0.191) 
GDP  growth  -0.035 -0.025 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.065) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Inflation rate  0.000  -0.000  0.001  0.000 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Effectiveness of the legislative  -0.255*  -0.243  -0.366***  -0.328** 
  (0.135) (0.366) (0.139) (0.139) 
Labor regulations obstacle  0.046  0.187  0.056  0.166 
  (0.138) (0.203) (0.187) (0.190) 
ICRG institutional index  -0.144**  -0.148***  -1.561**  -1.760** 
  (0.047) (0.033) (0.733) (0.726) 
ICRG institutional index * GDP      0.055*  0.062** 
     (0.028)  (0.028) 
Constant -3.295  -0.086  9.038*  10.673** 
  (3.474) (2.610) (4.970) (5.027) 
Observations  1815 1815 1815 1815 
Chi2 – firm variables  -  88.20  -  95.68 
   0.00   0.00 
Chi2 – country variables  38.15  38.36  39.99  40.20 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chi2 – all variables  38.15  133.7  39.99  133.3 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Between  countries  fit  0.294 0.264 0.269 0.277 
Within  countries  fit  - 0.170 - 0.168 
Overall  fit  0.294 0.310 0.269 0.324 
Rho (portion of variance due to ui)  0.0939 0.0954 0.0806 0.0786 
Log  likelihood  -1857 -1824 -1872 -1822 
Notes: See Table 5. Two variables were instrumented in these regressions: labor regulations obstacle and 
ICRG institutional index. For both of them, we used as instruments: democratic accountability, internal 
conflict, regional dummies, and the year of introduction of current electoral rule.  
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against its own people, it means that institutions are not strong enough to control 
the situation. It also means that people, feeling attacked by the government, could bias 
their opinion about labor or other regulations imposed by the government. Other in-
struments used are the regional dummies, which we have to include because the first 
stage regressions of the instrumental approach are run in OLS (as the instrumented 
variables are continuous), so we need to control for extra country-level variables not 
considered in our random-effects probit estimations. The last instrument is the year 
of introduction of the current electoral rule, which is also related to the kind of gov-
ernment the country has, but it is reasonable to expect that this variable is not linked 
to the dependent variable. 
Table 6 shows the instrumental variables findings. We find that country dif-
ferences in institutional quality have a  negative and statistically significant effect 
over informality, and that these differences across countries are smoothed with GDP.  
4. Potentially Omitted Variables 
The aim of this section is to assess the robustness of the results in our previous 
section by following a method developed by Sala-i-Martín (1997), which extends 
the seminal paper by Levine and Renelt (1992). He develops a robustness test by 
looking at the entire distribution of the estimator of the variable of interest by fo-
cusing on the fraction of the density function lying on each side of zero. If 95 percent 
of the density function for the estimates of the coefficient of interest lies to the right 
of zero, one could say that this variable is more likely to be correlated with our de-
pendent variable. Given that zero divides the area under the density in two, this re-
searcher denotes the larger of the two areas cdf(0), regardless of whether it is above 
or below zero. Under the assumption that the distribution of the coefficient of interest 
is non-normal the cdf(0) is calculated as follows. We consider a group of n variables 
classified as: (i) the dependent variable (yi), as measured by income quintiles, (ii) core 
explanatory variables (xB,i), or the vector of basic determinants, and (iii) ancillary 
variables (xA,i), representing a set of related auxiliary variables identified as being re-
lated to income quintile determination. 
Using our benchmark specification, we augment our empirical models by 
using the pool of ancillary variables XA. The idea is to choose up to two variables at 
a time and perform regressions using all the possible combinations based on our pool 
of ancillary variables. The ancillary variables employed are urban, percentage of fe-
male workers, fiscal deficit, inflation rate, rate of growth, income inequality, size of 
the  informal sector, perception of corruption at the  firm level, and perception of 
bureaucratic quality at the firm level. The source for all the variables except the in-
formal sector variable is the World Development Indicators from the World Bank 
(2006). For the informal sector variable, the source is Chong and Gradstein (2006), 
as they constructed informality measures based on different economic approaches. 
We test our basic specification for all possible combinations of ancillary variables 
and compute the estimates of the coefficient, its variance, the (integrated) likelihood, 
and the  individual cdf(0) for each regression. This is summarized in the  follow- 
ing vector:   ^`
22
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of our coefficient of interest JI as the weighted average of all individual cdf(0)s  
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. The variable of interest is said to be strongly correlated (i.e., 
is robust) with probability of ending up on a  determined quintile if the  weighted 
cdf(0) is greater than or equal to 0.95. In general, we find that our key results do not 
change, as all of the coefficients on our variables of interest that yield statistically 
significant coefficients are also statistically significant under this sensitivity test as 
well. 
5. Conclusions 
While firm-level characteristics are relevant to explain the variation in infor-
mality, we find evidence that most of the variation is driven by differences across 
countries in their respective levels of institutional quality. Commonly used measures 
of institutional strength emerge as the most statistically significant variable in ex-
plaining informality and the corruption behavior of firms. Yet, we also find evidence 
of a convergence club, whereby differences in legal compliance become smaller with 
a country’s income.  
APPENDIX
We perform an analysis of the variance by computing a goodness-of-fit meas-
ure resembling the calculation of an R-squared statistic for each level of analysis. We 
compute the goodness-of-fit measure for the within and between variations by calcu-
lating squared correlation coefficients between the observed and predicted probabili-
ties of our dependent variable on each level of analysis. This allows us to decompose 
the overall variance explained by the model to the one explained by the firm-level 
characteristics, independent of the  country, and the  one explained by the  country- 
-specific characteristics. In particular, a probit specification is set, owing to the di-
chotomous nature of the informality measure that was defined earlier and that is used 
as the dependent variable. Assuming a normal distribution for the random effects vi, 
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where, )  is the cumulative normal distribution, vi is the random effect, Xic is the non- 
-compliance variable for firm i in country c, Yic is a vector of firm-specific charac-
teristics, Zc is a vector of country-wide characteristics, and ȕF and ȕC are vectors of 
firm-specific and country-specific coefficients, respectively. Significance of the coef- 
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ficients ȕF  and ȕCwill imply that the respective firm-specific and/or country-specific 
characteristics matter. A  country-specific error term in the  random effects model 
helps avoid the problem originating from country-specific unobserved factors. The re-
ported goodness-of-fit measures for the overall, between, and within variances are 
computed from the correlation coefficients obtained respectively from the following 
equations (Chong and Gradstein, 2006): 
(i) Overall fit: 
   1 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ * P r1 | , w h e r e P r1 | ij ij ij ij yy X y X x U )D E          
(ii) Between-country fit:  
      2 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ *Pr 1| , where Pr 1| ii i i yy X y X x U )D E          
(iii) Within-country fit:  
      3 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ * P r1 | , w h e r e P r1 |P r 1 | ij ij ij ij ij ij i yy X y X y y X x x U )E                 
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